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STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j). It subsequently assigned the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 
A. Whether the trial court failed to properly consider Appellant's arguments 
regarding spot zoning, discrimination and unlawful taking. (Record, page 91 - 94.) 
B. Whether the trial court failed to properly allow the Defendant to continue its 
use of lot 14, Newport Subdivision as a preexisting use pursuant to §12-22-101, Woods 
Cross Ordinances. (R. at page 151, p.9) 
C. Whether the trial court failed to properly allow the Defendant to use the 
property as an accessory use to that of its legal use of property in Woods Cross and West 
Bountiful, pursuant to §12-14-104, Woods Cross Ordinances. (R. at page 151, p.8) 
Standard of Review 
These issues were resolved by Motion For Summary Judgment, therefore the 
appellate court reviews them for correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 
1004 (Utah 1994). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, §10-9-408 
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or 
structure may be continued. 
(b) a nonconforming use may be extended through the same 
building, provided no structural alteration of the building is 
proposed or made for the purpose of the extension. 
Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(f) Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that 
he cannot for t reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or it may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
Woods Cross City Ordinances, §1244-104 
Accessory uses and buildings customarily incidental to the permitted uses 
and conditional uses provided herein may be approved by the city in 
accordance with the provisions of this title. 
Woods Cross City Ordinances, §12-22-101 
This Chapter shall apply to the existing use of a building, structure or land 
lawfully established at the time of passage fo the zoning ordinance or any 
amendments thereto which does not conform to the present regulations of 
the zone in which it is located. Because Woods Cross is a community which 
has developed over a long period of time, the regulations of this Chapter are 
to allow continued use of such property or structure, while at the same time 
protecting existing conforming development and further orderly 
development and improvement of the community. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of the Proceeding 
This appeal is from an order granting Woods Cross City motion for Summary 
judgment entered by Judge Darwin C. Hansen, Second District Court, Davis County on 
October 16, 2000. 
II Course of Proceedings & Disposition in the Trial Court 
On August 15, 1999, Woods Cross City filed a complaint in the Second District 
Court claiming that Douglas Smith was in violation of Woods Cross City's zoning laws 
with respect to the use of certain lots located in the Newport Subdivision in Woods Cross 
City. On or about June 5, 2000, Woods Cross City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
which was granted by the trial court on October 16, 2000. 
II Statement of Relevant Facts 
Defendant/Appellant Douglas R. Smith is the owner of real property at issue herein 
and located in the Newport Subdivision in Woods Cross City. [R. at 30] It adjoins his 
property located within West Bountiful City. [R. at 33] Defendant Douglas Smith leases 
all the property to Ralph Smith Company, a trucking company, which has continuously 
used the property located inside and outside the Newport Subdivision since before 1991 to 
run its trucking business. The trucking company's office and repair buildings are legally 
operating and are within West Bountiful. [R. at 33] The property in Woods Cross is used 
to park and store trucks and equipment. [R. at 30] Woods Cross sued Douglas Smith to 
^ 
restrict his use of that portion of his property located in Woods Cross and within the 
Newport Subdivision. [R. at 4] 
Prior to purchasing said Newport subdivision property, continuously since 1986, 
Ralph Smith Co. had leased and used and continues to lease and use lot 14 of the 
Newport subdivision as part of its tucking business. [R. at 111] 
Most, if not all of the property around Defendant's site does not comply with the 
city's stated zoning classification. [R. at 111] The property located directly east of lot 5 of 
said subdivision is owned by Defendant or Phillips 66 Company (Phillips 66 uses said 
property as a buffer zone for possible pressure explosion). The property along the eastern 
edge of Defendant's property is a rail road track. Plaintiff, Woods Cross City owns lot 6 of 
said subdivision and upon information and belief plan to dig a flood-water catch-pond on 
said site. Other Newport subdivision lots are used as a contractor's open storage lot, steel 
fabrication plant, paint manufacturing plant, battery company's warehouse and truck 
parking, insulation company's truck yard, fiberglass fabrication shop, cargo trailers storage 
lot, open storage lots, and green concrete, shipping containers and equipment storage. 
There are high voltage power lines and towers which cross the Newport subdivision 
property, including the property of Defendant. The use of Defendant's property is 
consistent with other property uses in the area, especially the Newport subdivision lots. 
[R. at 111 -112.] 
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The current zoning ordinance covering this property was enacted in December 17, 
199L Prior to December 17, 1991, the property in question was zoned as MA which 
permitted any use permitted in a C-2 zone. C-2 zones, at all relevant times allowed for the 
operation of transfer companies. [R. at 96 and 106] 
Defendant Douglas R. Smith believes that he should be allowed to continuing the 
property as a preexisting use on lot 14, and other lots as an "accessory use" pursuant to 
§12-14-104, Woods Cross Ordinances. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court incorrectly failed to consider Defendant's defenses of spot zoning, 
discrimination, and unlawful taking of property without just compensation. Defendant 
put Plaintiff on notice of Defendant's intent to raise affirmative defenses in his answer, 
reiterated that notice in his Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance and made a motion to 
amend his answer if the trial court deemed it necessary. Defendant further adequately 
raised those affirmative defenses in his Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment by specifically naming each affirmative defense and providing supporting 
evidence and relevant legal authority. Said defenses raised material questions of fact 
which would have precluded summary judgment. 
Further the trial court incorrectly failed to find a valid non-conforming use as to lot 
14 of the Newport subdivision which has been used as part of the trucking business since 
1986. Last, the trial court incorrectly failed to consider and find that Defendant was 
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entitled to use the property as an accessory use pursuant to Woods Cross Ordinance §12-
14404. 
ARGUMENT 
L The Trial Court Incorrectly Refused to Consider Appellant's Arguments 
Regarding Spot Zoning, Discrimination, and Unlawful Taking of Property 
Without Just Compensation* 
In its order granting Summary Judgment to Appellee, Woods Cross City, the trial 
court stated: 
Defendant's claims of spot zoning, discrimination and an unlawful taking of 
property without just compensation have not been properly raised through 
pleadings or affidavits and therefore may not be considered by the court. 
No further statement or consideration regarding these issues was given by the court. Nor 
did the court even comment on Defendant's claim of an accessory use which was brought 
up in oral arguments on the Summary Judgment Motion. Defendant submits that these 
arguments were brought before and submitted to the trial court and should have been 
considered. 
A« Affirmative Defenses Were Raised in Defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion 
In Defendant's Answer, Defendant put Plaintiff on notice and reserved the right to 
claim any affirmative defenses that were found to exist through discovery. [R. at 11. ] 
When Plaintiff, Woods Cross City filed its motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant 
filed a motion under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(f) to get time for discovery. 
4* 
Defendant specifically noted that the discovery was needed in order to identify possible 
affirmative defenses. [R. at 63] Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the Rule 56(f) 
motion argued that as no affirmative defenses had been raised in Defendant's answer, they 
were too late. [R. at 59-60] Defendant's Reply Memorandum argued that the affirmative 
defenses were adequately raised under the liberalized notice pleading practice, but in the 
alternative included a Motion to Amend Answer if the court were to disagree that the 
affirmative defenses could be raised.1 [R. at 65]. The Court granted Defendants Rule 
56(f) motion to continue and made no ruling regarding Defendants Motion to Amend 
Answer. [R. at 80] Defendant submits that the Court's granting of Defendant's Rule 56(f) 
motion and ignoring the Motion to Amend Answer included an implied ruling that 
Defendant could raise its affirmative defenses and they would be considered for summary 
judgment. If such is not the case, then the trial court improperly considered the summary 
judgment motion without first ruling on Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer. 
B» The Specific Affirmative Defenses Were Properly Raised in Defendant's 
Memorandum In Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
In Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 996 P.2d 884, (Utah 1998), the court set forth 
the three prong test of whether an issue had been adequately raised to be considered in 
summary judgment and thus could be considered on appeal. Specifically, the court stated: 
lrThough Defendant did not name what affirmative defenses it was considering, 
both the memorandum and supporting affidavit made it clear that the affirmative defenses 
would be based on other land usage in the area. 
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That is, a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue, A 
trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following three requirements are 
met: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be 
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority. The purpose of such requirements is to put the 
Judge on notice of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for 
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. (Citations and 
Quotations omitted) 
Defendant submits that this same test is what a trial court must use to determine whether 
an issue has been adequately raised so that the trial court should consider it. Further, 
Defendant submits that the issues of spot zoning, discrimination and unlawful taking of 
property without just compensation were in fact adequately raised and should have been 
considered by the trial court. 
L Issues were raised in a timely fashion. 
As was shown above by raising the affirmative defenses in its Rule 56(f) motion 
and Motion to Amend Answer, Defendant put Plaintiff and the court on notice as soon as 
practicable that it intended to raise affirmative defenses discovered in discovery and made 
a Motion to Amend Answer so that proper procedure could be followed. The court by 
granting the Rule 56(f) motion and not ruling on the Motion to Amend, by implication 
held that any affirmative defenses raised in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment would be timely. 
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2» Issues Were Specifically Raised 
Defendant in its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
specifically raised the issues of spot zoning, discrimination, and taking of property without 
just compensation. In fact each such issue had its own heading and at least one paragraph 
devoted solely to that specific issue. [R. at 90-94] 
3* Defendant introduced supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority for each issue* 
Again in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment each issue raised was supported by the affidavit testimony of the property owner 
Douglas Smith. In said affidavit Douglas Smith indicated that his property is virtually 
surrounded by property which does not conform to the zoning classification which 
supports his spot zoning claim and discrimination. He also indicated that considering the 
non-conforming uses of the other property around him, and the current zoning 
classification, he would be left with no other viable use for his property which supports his 
claim of a taking of property with just compensation. [R. 110-112] 
Defendant also cited relevant legal authority for each issue. He cited 
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Association, v. Engh Floral Company 545 P.2d. 1150 
(Utah 1976) wl>ich outlines what creates an illegal spot zone. He cited Marshall v. Salt 
Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P-2d 704, (1943) which holds that courts may set aside 
zoning that is confiscatory or discriminatory in support of his claims of discrimination and 
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taking of property without just compensation. He also cited Smith Investment Company v. 
Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Utah Court of Appeals 1998) which states that, "a statute 
regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a taking if it denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land." [R. at 90-94] 
Defendant submits that the issues, evidence and authority presented in his 
memorandum raised sufficient questions of material fact that summary judgment should 
have been denied. Clearly it was raised sufficiently that it should have been at least 
considered by the court. 
C« Defendant Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact Which Should Preclude 
Summary Judgment, 
L Plaintiff has created an illegal "spot zone" 
The remaining lots owned by Defendant in the Newport subdivision are virtually 
the only lots in the entire subdivision to which the 14 zoning applies.2 It would seem that 
Plaintiffs plan was and is to reclassify an existing area (one almost surrounded by 
industrial uses) and then through time and attrition phase out the non conforming uses. 
This apparent plan has created an ordinance which has the effect of creating a spot zone 
2
 This subdivision was apparently platted prior to Plaintiffs zoning change in 1991. 
Therefore virtually all of lots in the subdivision are now valid nonconforming uses under 
the current zoning ordinance. 
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that leaves Defendants lots bordered on at least three sides by lots and property whose 
uses are consistent if not almost equivalent with the use Plaintiff is trying to prohibit here. 
Spot zoning is defined in Crestvkw-Holladay Homeowners Association, v. Engh 
Floral Company 545 P.2d. 1150, (Utah 1976), as follows: 
Spot zoning results in the creation of two types of "islands." One type results 
when the zoning authority improperly limits the use which may be made of a 
small parcel located in the center of an unrestricted area. The second type 
of "island" results when most of a large district is devoted to a limited or 
restricted use, but additional uses are permitted in one or more spots in the 
district. 
The spot zoning effect which the Plaintiff has created in this case is the first type 
listed above. The Plaintiff has created a situation in which virtually the only lots in this 
subdivision owned by Defendant are subject to the zoning ordinance and thus a spot zone 
is created. 
Defendant concedes that courts give broad discretion to cities legislative zoning 
actions and will uphold legislative zoning actions as long as they, "cotiffcf promote the 
genexa^welfere; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in tne inf fewest of the general 
welfare", Smith Investment Company v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Utah Court of Appeals 
1998) quoting Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111,141 V.1A 704, (1043). However, 
as indicated in Marshall courts may set aside zora&ythat is confirmatory, discriminatory or 
arbitrary. 
Ah 
2» The Effect of Plaintiff s Zoning is EHscriminatorv 
The effect of the zoning as applied is discriminatory against Defendant since it 
treats him differently than virtually all other persons who own property in the Newport 
subdivision. It effectually forbids Defendant from using his property in same way others in 
the subdivision and surrounding area are allowed to use their property. In fact it forbids 
Defendant from using his property for a use which he is allowed to use other property he 
owns which adjoins the property in question. 
3. The Effect of the Zoning Law Is a Taking by Plaintiff Without Tust 
Compensation 
Should this court allow Plaintiff to enforce its stated zoning, it will effect a taking 
for which Defendant has not been justly compensated. Defendants property is located in 
an area that is primarily if not entirely made up of industrial uses. In fact, as has been 
show above, said property is virtually surrounded by industrial type business equivalent to 
Defendant. In spite of this reality the only private permitted uses of the property under 
the L-l zoning classification is a professional office building3. Considering the surrounding 
uses of the area, a professional office building would be economically unfeasible for the 
3
 The permitted uses for 14 include professional office building and public parks, utilities 
and buildings. All other uses are conditional uses. Woods Cross has made clear that they have 
not intention of working with plaintiff, having even refused to consider Defendant's conditional 
use application citing this appeal. 
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property. It would be surrounded by the current industrial park. Simply, Defendant is left 
without any viable use for said property. 
In Smith Investment Company, supra, the court stated: "A statute regulating the uses 
that can be made of property effects a taking if it denies an owner economically viable use 
of his land." This is clearly the case here. By attempting to enforce their stated zoning, 
Plaintiff is in reality depriving Defendant of any economically viable use of his land 
without just compensation. 
Defendant understands the broad deference given to municipalities to effect zoning 
as they see best. Defendant also submits that when, as in this instance, the effect of such 
zoning and the enforcement thereof apparently applies to only one property owner in an 
area to his detriment, the municipality has exceeded the limits of such deference. This is 
especially true when, as here, there is a history of the municipality and the landowner 
being at loggerheads. 
IL The trial court failed to properly allow the Defendant to continue its use of lot 
14, Newport Subdivision as a preexisting use pursuant to §12-22-101, Woods 
Cross Ordinances* 
In the trial courts order granting summary judgment, the court found that: 
Currently lot fourteen of the property is being used for the parking of 
personal vehicles and recreational vehicles such as jet skis, trailers and 
campers. [R. at 139] 
and based on that finding, concluded that: 
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to the extent Defendant ever used lot 14 in its trucking business, said use 
has ceased for a period in excess of three months, and therefore may not be 
reinitiated under the provisions of the Woods Cross Zoning Ordinance. [R. 
at 140] 
However, the trial court did not seem to consider whether the "personal vehicles" stored 
were being stored on a private basis separate from the trucking company or whether they 
were being stored as part of the trucking business as an employee benefit or other trucking 
business related use. The court must have made this finding and conclusion based on the 
affidavit of Plaintiffs employee, Tim Stephens, who stated that as long as he can 
remember this personal vehicles had been stored on this lot. [R. at 129.] Again, however, 
the Affidavit of Tim Stephens does not indicate whether the vehicles stored on lot 14 
were being stored by and as part of the trucking business. 
The only competent evidence on this matter was provided in the second affidavit 
of Defendant Douglas Smith.4 In that affidavit, Douglas Smith stated that lot 14 was 
being used by the trucking business and had been so used since 1986. [R. at 111]. Not 
only has lot 14 been used prior to zoning enactment, said use is a preexisting non-
conforming use and is legally entitled to continue. Utah courts have made clear the fact 
that local governments cannot, through zoning changes, require property owners to 
discontinue preexisting nonconforming uses. See Gibbons & Reed Company v. North Salt 
Lake City, 481 P.2d 559 (1967). The Gibbons court held that a "zoning ordinance which 
4
 Douglas Smith is the owner of the property and also the Vice President of the 
trucking Company which leases the property. [R. at 32] 
requires the discontinuance ... of a nonconforming use would be a deprivation of property 
without due process of law." Id. at 563. This unequivocal holding is echoed in § 10-9-408 
of the Utah Code which provides with certain exceptions (none of which are applicable 
here) that "a nonconforming use may be continued." Similarly, the Cityfs own zoning 
ordinances recognize that nonconforming uses may continue at the discretion of the 
landowner, not the City. Section 12-22-101 on Prior Non Conforming Uses provides: 
This Chapter shall apply to the existing use of a building, structure or land 
lawfully established at the time of passage fo the zoning ordinance or any 
amendments thereto which does not conform to the present regulations of 
the zone in which it is located. Because Woods Cross is a community which 
has developed over a long period of time, the regulations of this Chapter are 
to allow continued use of such property or structure, while at the same time 
protecting existing conforming development and further orderly 
development and improvement of the community. 
There is no question that Defendant has a valid non-conforming use right with respect to 
lot 14. Said lot has been used and is continues to be used to park vehicles as a part of the 
trucking business. 
The only real issue is whether Woods Cross City, can differentiate between 
vehicles on the basis of size, type, color or any other factors. Defendant submits that a 
prior existing use as a parking lot is exactly that and that Defendant may continue to park 
vehicles of all kinds on lot 14. 
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IIL The trial court failed to properly allow the Defendant to use the property as an 
accessory use pursuant to §12-14-104, Woods Cross Ordinances* 
At the oral arguments on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant 
raised the issue of whether property in question should be allowed to be used as an 
accessory use to the lawful non-conforming use, [R. at 151, p. 8] Woods Cross 
Ordinances §1244404 states: 
Accessory uses and buildings customarily incidental to the permitted uses 
and conditional uses provided herein may be approved by the city in 
accordance with the provisions of this title. 
In the case at bar, Defendant has a lawful use for the property which is not in the Newport 
subdivision, but contiguous to the Newport Subdivision property. As such, Defendant's 
use of the property located in the Newport subdivision should qualify as a valid accessory 
use to. The trial court incorrectly failed to address the issue of accessory use. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was in clear error when it failed to consider the affirmative defenses 
of spot zoning, discrimination and taking of property without just compensation, raised by 
Defendant. Said defenses were adequately pled and created factual issues which would 
preclude summary judgment. Further, the trial court again erred in not finding a valid 
non-conforming use with respect to lot 14 of the Newport subdivision. Finally the trial 
court erred in not considering and finding a valid accessory to Defendants lawful use of 
adjoining property as to the remaining lots in question. Accordingly Defendant's request 
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that the trial court's order granting Summary Judgment be reversed and the case be 
remanded for the above issues to be considered. 
Dated this 5th day of July, 2001. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this July 6, 2001,1 caused two true and correct copies for 
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Tab A 
Michael Z. Hayes (#1432) 
Todd J. Godfrey (#6094) 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725 
Telephone: (801) 272-8998 
Fax: (801)272-1551 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
WOODS CROSS CITY, a Utah municipal : 
corporation, : 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS R. SMITH, dba RALPH : Case No. 990700317 
SMITH TRUCKING COMPANY, : 
: Judge Darwin C. Hansen 
Defendant. : 
—oooOooo— 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the court on September 
21,2000, at 3:00 p.m., before the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen. Plaintiff was represented by Todd 
J. Godfrey and Michael Z. Hayes. Defendant was represented by Randy B. Birch. The court being 
duly advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor, the court hereby enters its order 
granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as follows: 
FILi 
OCT 1 9 2000 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
05\Lit\RS Truck\Order 
n n -• «•» *> 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Defendant is the owner of property located within Woods Cross City, which property 
is more particularly described in Plaintiffs Memoranda in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in the Complaint on file in this matter, (the "Property"). 
2. The Property is zoned 1-1, light industrial. 
3. Defendant is currently using Lot 5 and Lots 7 -13 of the Property to park large trucks 
and other equipment used in its trucking business. 
4. Currently, Lot 14 of the Property is being used for the parking of personal vehicles 
and other recreational vehicles such as jet skis, trailers and campers. 
5. Defendant's use of Lot 5 and Lots 7-13 of the Property is neither a permitted use nor 
a conditional use within the 1-1 zone. 
6. Defendant has never applied for nor received conditional use approval or site plan 
approval for the operation of a trucking company on the Property. 
7. Plaintiff has requested that Defendant cease its unauthorized use of its Property. 
8. Defendant has failed to comply with the request of the City. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts, the court HEREBY CONCLUDES AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendants current use of lot 5 and lot 7 through 13 of the Property violates the 
Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance. 
05\Lit\RS Truck\Order 2 
2. Based upon the violation of the City Zoning Ordinance, the City is entitled, as a 
matter of law, to an injunction, enjoining any further use in violation of the City Zoning 
Ordinance. 
3. To the extent Defendant ever used lot 14 in its trucking business, said use has 
ceased for a period in excess of three months, and therefore may not be reinitiated under the 
provisions of the Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance. 
4. Defendant's claims of spot zoning, discrimination and an unlawful taking of 
property without just compensation have not been properly raised through pleadings or affidavits 
and therefor may not be considered by the court. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts and conclusions of law, it is HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Defendant is hereby permanently enjoined from any further use of Lot 5 and Lots 
7-14 of the Newport Subdivision in Woods Cross City which violates the City's Zoning 
Ordinances and is hereby ordered to cease the use of Lot 5 and Lots 7-14 of the Newport 
Subdivision in Woods Cross City for its trucking operations. 
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DATED this _£_ day o f / < ^ < - 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
By:. 
Randy B. Birch 
Bertch & Birch - East 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^[/ day of September, 2000,1 caused to be mailed, first-
class United States mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to 
the following: 
Randy B. Birch 
Bertch & Birch - East 
114 South 200 West 
P.O. Box 763 
HeberCity,UT 84032 
J^HXAJX A ^ W / l M ^ 
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Appellant Case No. 20001024 - SC 
HEARING HELD SEPTEMBER 21, 2000 
BEFORE 
HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN 
ORIGINAL 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
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For the Plaintiff: TODD J. GODFREY 
MAZURAN & HAYES 
For the Defendant: RANDY B. BIRCH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
* * * 
Cross City 
FARMINGTON, UTAH 
HONORABLE DARWIN 
P R 0 C E 
THE COURT: The next 
against Douglas R. 
- SEPTEMBER 21, 2000 
C. HANSEN PRESIDING 
E D I N G S 
matter is the 
Smith. This is 
case 
» case 
of Woods 
number 
990700317. This is the time set for the motion for summary 
judgment by Woods Cross City in this matter. 
And counsel, may I have you, for the record, make 
your appearances please? 
MR. GODFREY: Your Honor, Todd Godfrey with Michael 
Hayes for Woods Cross City. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BIRCH: Randy Birch and Doug (inaudible) on 
behalf of Doug Smith, Your Honor* 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. ?: Just to clarify, Randy Birch is the attorney, 
Doug Smith is [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
UNKNOWN: Okay. 
THE COURT: I understand. And I thank you very much 
for [inaudible]. 
Gentlemen, I have reviewed the written memorandum 
filed on this case and most of the cases that you have 
submitted. And I know Woods Cross has submitted copies of 
cases that have been highlighted and I have reviewed those 
1 
matters. 
you wish. 
With that in mind, 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
understand we 
I guess. 
[inaudibl 
Mr. Godfrey, ; 
GODFREY: Thank you, 
COURT: Do you 
GODFREY: If we 
don't and we'11 
Randy, can you see 
MR. 
MR. 
e], * 
need 
i had 
. have 
okay? 
BIRCH: Actually, no 
GODFREY: I'll 
four Honor. 
move 
/ou may 
Your Honor. 
a easel c 
one that 
to make 
. But I1 
out here 
Df some 
proceed, if 
kind? 
would be helpful. I 
use of some chairs, 
rll make due. 
for just a moment 
THE COURT: You have filed -
MR. GODFREY: Similar math. 
THE COURT: Yes. And let me just - I'm with you. Go 
ahead. 
MR. GODFREY: Okay. Your Honor, this - generally 
this shows the property that's at issue. If you'll note 
there's kind of a heavy cross line right here. This is the 
boundary between West Bountiful City and Woods Cross City. 
Ralph Smith Trucking generally occupies this property and a 
portion of this property below. 
This property here that is outlined in green on the 
map is property that is not at issue in this case. The city 
recognizes that Smith Trucking has been using this property for 
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an extended period of time. We believe they have a valid non-
conforming use on all the property that's shown as marked in 
green. And, you know, that's not at issue at all in this 
matter. 
THE COURT: And that is property within the 
boundaries of Woods Cross City? 
MR. GODFREY: From here down it is. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. GODFREY: From the line up it's in West 
Bountiful. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MR. GODFREY: The property that's outlined in yellow 
is property that's within the New Port subdivision. Mr. Smith 
essentially owns lot five and lot seven through 14 of the New 
Port Subdivision. And that's the property that is an issue in 
this matter. 
The property down here below the New Port Subdivision 
- it's not really shown on the map, it's just shown as a vacant 
parcel is a newly approved residential subdivision in the city. 
Just currently homes are being constructed within that area. 
By way of orientation I think that sort of describes 
the property we're talking about. 
THE COURT: And I have found -
MR. GODFREY: Good. 
THE COURT: Do you have a copy of this, Mr. Birch? 
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MR. BIRCH: I don't believe I've seen it. 
MR. GODFREY: It actually is attached to his 
memorandum, not to the city's. 
MR. BIRCH: Yeah - oh - yeah. All right. The colors 
there are different but that could have happened in the copies. 
THE COURT: All right. I understand. 
MR. GODFREY: Your Honor, this property - the 
property at issue, outlined in yellow on the map that I've just 
shown the Court, is zoned 1-1. It's a light industrial zone. 
The use that's currently taking place on that property is not 
an allowed use under the city's zoning statutes. State law 
provides that the city has the right to an injunction. 
Essentially estoppel may be used that's in violation of the 
zoning ordinances. That statute set forth in Utah code 
annotated section 10-9-1002. 
Case law also supports the city's right to an 
injunction. Case law specifically provides that the city 
doesn't have to show any kind of irreparable injury to be 
entitled to that injunctive relief. 
In their brief, the defendants have attempted to 
raise an issue as to the use of lot 14 of the subdivision. 
That's outlined in blue on the map as you can see right here. 
In that respect I would refer the Court to the second affidavit 
of Tim Stevens which is attached to our reply memorandum. With 
that affidavit are pictures which are authenticated by Mr. 
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Stevens as being true and accurate representations of the 
property on a day he viewed that early this month. And those 
pictures show the current use of that property. There are no 
trucks of Ralph Smith Trucking parked on that property. That 
property is fenced in. It's separated from the rest of the 
property and it's currently being used to park normal passenger 
type vehicles and some small recreational vehicles, campers and 
other things, but there are no large trucks on that property. 
In addition, Mr. Stevens states in his capacity as a 
zoning administrator, he's familiar with the property and that 
it hasn't been used to park large trucks, in his memory, for an 
extended period of time. City ordinances provide that if a use 
has ceased for a period in excess of three months, that use is 
essentially abandoned and a property can't again be applied to 
a non-conforming use. 
We think that's the status of this property. We 
don't believe that Smith Trucking has any right to park their 
large trucks on lot 14 in the New Port Subdivision. 
In summary, I actually really truly believe this is a 
very, very simple matter. It was either late *96 or early *97 
when Smith Trucking began to expand their operations from the 
permitted where I guess the allowed property in West Bountiful 
down into this property in Woods Cross City, where the zoning 
is not appropriate for that use and where they don't have any 
valid non-conforming use rights. 
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1 In early *97 the city contacted the owners and told 
2 them their use was unlawful. They have ignored the orders from 
3 the city to cease that use. They're defiant in their disregard 
4 of the city's regulations and I don't believe there's any 
5 genuine issue of material fact as to any of the use of those 
6 properties. 
7 And on that matter we'd submit. I would like to 
8 reserve some time for rebuttal on this. 
9 THE COURT: You may. Thank you Mr. Godfrey. 
10 Mr. Birch, please? 
11 MR. BIRCH: Thank you, Your Honor. 
12 I realize the Court hasn't had opportunity to view 
13 the property like counsel has, but it does change your 
14 perspective. 
15 I've been to the site. And I've looked at the 
16 property. And then as this came closer to briefing and what 
17 not, I went back out and looked at the property and I think 
18 it's - a couple of points that I want to make. 
19 First of all, that this property is only - the only 
20 permitted use is a public park or utility, I think it says. 
21 Right? Or an office building. 
22 Your Honor, right here we have a railroad track. 
23 Right here - admittedly, this is West Bountiful, okay, it's not 
24 Woods Cross. It's a - it's a huge refinery. As a matter of 
25 fact there are some large silver, [inaudible] what they're 
called. Some sort of a - that Phillips owns, and they have 
purchased this huge - this large lot as a buffer. It's a 
vacant trailer court. Now are you - are we really going to put 
office buildings in an area that Phillips has determined is 
worth buying to create a buffer in case of an explosion? I 
don't think so, Your Honor. In fact, I'll guarantee it. 
THE COURT: Are you arguing that the zoning is wrong 
and the city shouldn't have passed that zone? 
MR. BIRCH: That is an argument. It's not what I'm 
trying to argue right now. I'm trying to - I just want you to-
THE COURT: If that's [inaudible] -
MR. BIRCH: - understand a picture. 
THE COURT: That standard is an awfully tough 
standard [inaudible]. 
MR. BIRCH: I've not filed suit for that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BIRCH: May in the future, I guess. But that's 
not where we're at. I'm just trying to paint a picture of this 
area, Your Honor. Okay? 
There's another set of railroad tracks right here. 
So you've got railroad tracks to the west, railroad tracks to 
the east and my client owns most - well, between him and 
Phillips probably half of the land in between. 
I also think it's important, note, and maybe I get 
caught up in - I know I get caught up in my cases. But Ralph 
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Smith Trucking uses this area that they do not dispute. His 
offices are here. His trucking service bays are here. All 
that is occurring back here is the parking of vehicles. And I 
would note that the I-l zone calls for office buildings, yadda 
yadda. We obviously don't have an office building. But 
conditional uses are automotive service centers. Well, we 
don't even have an automotive service center in that area. 
Although, I would represent that we were applying and have 
applied for a conditional use permit. We keep being told that 
it's not worth the (inaudible) time we're not going to give it 
to you. But at my insistence my client have applied, Your 
Honor. 
But I think it's also important to note that 1214-104 
talks about accessory uses. Access - and this is not part of 
my brief, as I got the statutes I started to review them again. 
Accessory uses, incidental to permitted use and conditional 
uses provided herein may be approved by the city in accordance 
with the provisions as titled. I guess that means that 
incidental uses can be conditional. I'm not sure quite what 
that language says. But my point is only this, their actual 
bays and shops are in West Bountiful. Their offices are in 
West Bountiful. Any parking that goes on in this space is 
incidental to what activity is actually occurring in West 
Bountiful. And I think that's important for the Court to know. 
We would dispute their categorization of not parking 
here. I don't see how the size of the truck that you're 
parking in an area means you can or can't park it there or it's 
a change of use. At least I've not distinguished as I perused 
- and I'll be the first to admit I haven't digested this volume 
-but as I pursued these ordinances I did not see a distinction 
between the size of vehicles you're parking. And indeed, most 
of the vehicles and some of the accessories counsel has 
referenced, are parked there for - on behalf of employees. 
They're actually employees things that are parked there. 
Employee parking for lack of a better statement. 
So my point that I'm trying to make is that the 
business is in West Bountiful. There is parking going on back 
here. Absolutely, we're not trying to deny that. Look at the 
photos that have been provided. You can sort of see the area, 
weeds and photos. My client has talked to some of the 
neighbors that are building here to the south. That was a 
little bit of a concern. And they'd rather have him there 
parking his vehicles than other options. Not necessarily 
relevant but I think it is important for the Court to 
understand that they've in essence done, is created a zone 
where Doug Smith owns most of the property and then tell him he 
can't use it. 
I think I've addressed the lot 14 issue, Your Honor. 
Like I said, I think it's important to look at this zoning 
picture as a whole and evaluate whether or not this is a, like 
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1 I say, I think it's an accessory use. 
2 Do you have any questions, Your Honor? 
3 THE COURT: I don't. Thank you. 
4 MR. GODFREY: Your Honor, as to the argument that 
5 this is an accessory use to a primary use, Mr. Birch's own 
6 statement is that that requires approval from the city. The 
7 city never gave him that approval and there's never been an 
8 application made for that. 
9 Additionally, this is completely different parcel and 
10 parcels of property. Accessory use on a different parcel would 
11 certainly require the city's approval or at least review and 
12 the city hasn't even had the opportunity to do that. 
13 Mr. Smith has known that the city objects to this use 
14 of the property since that lease in 1997 and he's made no 
15 effort, at all, to come into compliance with the city's 
16 regulations. 
17 As to the issues about lot 14, I would simply 
18 indicate that I think as a matter of law the Court can 
19 distinguish between the parking of passenger vehicles and 
20 I campers without the truck, from the parking of huge double 
21 belly dump trucks and trailers. There's a significant 
I 4 
22 difference in terms of the impact on the property and the 
23 impact on the adjoining uses, one of which, I would point out, 
24 is a residential subdivision. 
25 As to Mr. Birch's arguments regarding the zoning, the 
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1 time to challenge the wisdom of Wood Cross City zoning 
2 decisions passed, at the very latest, in early 1992. These 
3 regulations have been on the books for a significant amount of 
4 time* 
5 He indicates that the city has zoned Mr. Smith's 
6 property. Mr. Smith didn't purchase this property until four 
7 or five years after the zoning went into effect. He owned the 
8 property here. Most of these lots were purchased by him in x96 
9 or x97 - or 9^5 excuse me. 
10 Finally, as to lot 14, I think it's very important to 
11 note that there is absolutely no issue of fact whatsoever that 
12 would indicate that the use of these lots, five and seven 
13 through 13, have in any way gained any rights or any - I guess 
14 approvals - for use. There are no defenses as to those lots 
15 other than those in the brief regarding spot zoning and 
16 discriminatory zoning and takings which aren't properly before 
17 the Court. They aren't brought forth in any proper pleading; 
18 there's been no motion to admit a complaint. They simply 
19 aren't before the Court and they don't - they don't pass any 
20 test on the merits that's set forth in our brief. 
21 I think, again, the issues in this case are very 
22 simple. It's cut and dried that it is a summary judgment case. 
23 I think the city is entitled to the injunction and I would ask 
24 the Court to so rule. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
11 
Gentlemen I have reviewed the case law which you have 
submitted to me and I've also reviewed the written memorandum. 
And it seems to me the relevant facts in this case, that are 
uncontroverted are those relevant facts set forth in the moving 
papers filed by Woods Cross. And now Mr. Smith has raised some 
issues in his further statement of facts, but I do not see 
those issues to be a statement of material fact that gives rise 
to an issue relative to the legal principles that need to be 
applied in this case. 
I think the motion for summary judgment should be 
granted and I'm going to grant the injunction based upon the 
summary judgment motion. 
I'm going to request, Mr. Godfrey, that you prepare 
an appropriate order. And that order should set forth the 
uncontroverted facts as I've indicated in your moving papers 
and that order also set forth conclusions of law consistent 
with your moving paper and also with respect to the reply. 
The Court believes that the issue of spot zoning 
discrimination or a taking without just compensation doesn't 
give rise to a material issue of fact in this case because they 
are not listed as an affirmative defense and I think it's 
improper for me to consider those matters as creating an issue 
of fact. 
For those reasons I'm going to grant the motion and 
proceed on that basis. 
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And Mr. Godfrey, submit the proposed paper to the 
other side for their review and then submit it to me. 
MR. BIRCH: Your Honor, could we get a certification 
of the final decision on that. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
MR. BIRCH: Certification 60-40 or 50-40 or whatever 
[inaudible]. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. GODFREY: No. 
THE COURT: I - this then - this resolves the 
litigation in full, does it not? 
MR. GODFREY: It does, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, then I don't know that you need a 
certification then if it's a final order. 
The claim of the city goes for an injunction. I've 
granted that, that is the final order. And if you wish to 
appeal then of course you may do so. 
Anything further, counsel? 
MR. GODFREY: Nothing further. 
MR. BIRCH: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
[Whereupon the proceedings were concluded) 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript 
in the before mentioned hearings held before Judge Darwin 
C. Hansen was transcribed by me from an videotape 
and is a full, true, and correct transcription of the 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the 
best of my ability. 
Signed this 19th day of March, 2001 in 
Sandy, Utah. 
n JCM^P^V^ 
Carolyn ^ rickson 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
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My Commission expires May 4, 2002 
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CAROLYN ERICKSON 
i r75 ELLEN WAY 
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Randy Birch (#4197) 
Bertch & Birch - East 
114 South 200 West 
P.O. Box 763 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Telephone: (801) 654-4300 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WOODS CROSS CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DOUGLAS R. SMITH, dba RALPH SMITH | 
TRUCKING COMPANY, | 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS SMITH 
Civil No.990700317 
Judge Darwin C. Hansen 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
AflBant, DOUGLAS SMITH, being first duly sworn, under oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant is over the age of twenty one (21) years or age, a resident of the state of Utah, competent 
to testify, and that the statements made herein are based on personal knowledge or where so 
stated on information and belief. 
2. Affiant is the owner of the real property which is the subject of this action. 
3. Affiant leases said property to Ralph Smith Co. 
4. Ralph Smith Co. has continuously used the site in question since 1991 as a truck yard. 
To the best of affiant's knowledge, most of the property around Defendants site does not comply 
with the city's stated zoning classification. 
Plaintiff approached affiant requesting to purchase a portion of said site and their request was 
refused. 
Affiant does not have the letters claimed sent by Plaintiff and has not received copies of said 
letters as a part of this lawsuit. 
All of the other information which affiant needs to defend against this action is in the control and 
or possession of Plaintiff. 
Said information includes dates and changes of zoning; compliance and/or grants of variances or 
conditional use permits to surrounding property; enforcement proceedings regarding zoning 
against other nearby property owners; Plaintiffs desire to acquire said site; and prior court 
decisions. 
Further Affiant Sayeth Not: 
Dated this / c ^ Day of June 2000. 
Douglas 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this. Day of June, 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RANDY B. BIRCH 
5296 S Commerce Or No 100 
Sal! Lake City, Utah 84107 
'v< Commission Expires 
u«gust 8 2000 
r
' ~ ' ~
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/ 
^Notary Public 
'(c% ^JC 
A i i n r e 
SERVICE CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify than on fc-(3 , 2000,1: 
BJ mailed postage prepaid 
[] faxed to No. 
[] hand delivered 
a true and correct copy of the Foregoing Affidavit of Douglas Smith, to the following: 
Michael Z. Hays 
Todd J. Godfrey 
Mazuran & Hayes, P.C 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725 
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Randy B. Birch, #4197 
BERTCH & BIRCH - East 
114 South 200 West 
P.O. Box 763 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Telephone: (801) 654-4300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WOODS CROSS CITY, 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
a Utah municipal 
v. 
DOUGLAS R. SMITH, dba RALPH 
SMITH TRUCKING COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
DOUGLAS R. SMITH 
Civil No.990700317 
Judge Darwin C. Hansen 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, DOUGLAS SMITH, being first duly sworn, under oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant is over the age of twenty one (21) years or age, a resident of the state of Utah, 
competent to testify, and that the statements made herein are based on personal 
knowledge or where so stated, on information and belief. 
2. Affiant is the owner of the real property located in Woods Cross City. 
3. Part of said property is located in the Newport subdivision. 
A TU<± mmaininn nr™v*rtv thmioh rnntioiioii^ to affiant's Newnort subdivision nrooertv, is 
not part of the Newport subdivision. See the attached Exhibit A. 
5. Affiant leases all of said property to Ralph Smith Co. 
6. Ralph Smith Co. has continuously used the property located outside the Newport 
Subdivision since before 1991 to run it's trucking business. 
7. Regarding the property inside the subdivision, Affiant is the owner of lots 5 and 7-14 of 
the Newport subdivision. See Exhibit A. 
8. Prior to Affiant purchasing said Newport subdivision property, Ralph Smith Co. had 
already leased and used lot 14 of the Newport subdivision as part of its trucking business 
continuously since 1986. 
9. To the best of affiant's knowledge, most, if not all of the property around Defendants site 
does not comply with the city's stated zoning classification. 
10. Lots 3 and 4 of the Newport subdivision are used as a steel fabrication plant and paint 
manufacturing plant respectively. See Exhibit A. 
11. The property located directly east of lot 5 of said subdivision is owned by Affiant or 
Phillips 66 company (Phillips 66 uses said property as a buffer zone for possible pressure 
explosion). See Exhibit A. 
12. Plaintiff owns lot 6 of said subdivision, and based upon information and belief, plans to 
dig a flood-water catch-pond on said site. See Exhibit A. 
13. The property along the eastern edge of Affiant's property is a rail road track. See Exhibit 
A. 
D«.~r^ O ~ * * A n n i 1 1 
14. Other Newport subdivision lots are used as follows: 
Lot 1 — Contractors open storage lot 
Lot 2 — Interstate battery, storage and distribution/trucking 
Lot 20 — Hansen Insulation, storage and distribution/trucking 
Lot 15 — Fiberglass fabrication and distribution shop 
Lot 16 — Cargo Trailers storage lot 
Lot 17 — Open storage lot 
Lot 18 & 22 — Hawk open storage lot 
Lot 23 — Green concrete containers and equipment storage 
See Exhibit A. 
15. There are high voltage power lines and towers which cross the Newport subdivision 
property, including the property owned by Affiant. 
16. The use of affiant's property is consistent with other uses in the area, especially the 
Newport subdivision. 
17. Affiant sees no economical viable uses of said property considering the surrounding uses 
and the permitted uses under the 1-1 zoning classification. 
18. Prior to this action, Plaintiff approached Affiant requesting to purchase a portion of his 
property to use as part of Woods Cross's flood control plan, and Affiant declined to sell. 
19. Woods Cross then asked Affiant for a site plan. Affiant said he would provide the same 
once a flood control plan was provided so as to avoid reworking the site. No flood 
control plan was ever provided to Affiant, and indeed, to this day, uncontrolled storm 
water flows across Affiant's property. 
20. Affiant believes this lawsuit may have been motivated in retaliation for Affiant's 
unwillingness to sell. 
Further Affiant sayeth not-
Dated this ^ day of September 2000. 
Douglas Smith, Affiant 
Subscribed and swom to before me this ^ day of September, 2000 
NOTARY PU3UC 
CARROL L HOGGATT 
230 West 1500 South 
BoumrfuJ, UT 34010 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
wav 15, 2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
Notary Public 
SERVICE CERTIFICATE 
1 hereby certify than on September 5. 2000.1: 
[X] mailed postage prepaid 
[X] faxed to No. 801 272-1551 
f] hand delivered 
a true and correct copy of the Foregoing Second Affidavit of Douglas Smith, to the 
following: 
Michael Z: Hays 
Todd J. Godfrey 
Mazuran Sc Hayes, P.C. 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725 
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